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A MISDIAGNOSIS AND AN IMPROPER PROSCRIPTION?
CONCERNS AND CRITICISMS OF PROPOSED S~E.. C.. RULE 127B

I.

INTRODUCTION

On April 16, 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission

C~SEC")

filed securities

fraud charges against Goldman, Sachs & Co. ("GS&Co") and a GS&Co employee, Fabrice
Tourre ("Tourre"), for making material misrepresentations and omissions in connection with a
synthetic collateralized debt obligation 1 (''CDO'') GS&Co structured and marketed to investors
as the U.S. housing market was beginning to falter?
The synthetic CDO that GS&Co structured and marketed hinged on the performance of
subprime residential mortgage-backed securities3 ("RMBS").4

Allegedly, GS&Co failed to

disclose vital information about the CDO to investors, in particular the role that a major hedge
fund played in the portfolio selection process and that the same hedge fund had taken a short
position5 against the CD0. 6

1

A CDO is a basket of assets or income streams that are pooled together, split into subordinated repayment rights
rated by a credit rating agency and sold to investors. The assets may consist of cash assets, such as
bonds, loans, preferred securities, mortgages, or even tranches of other CDOs. When a CDO is created from a cash
asset, it is called a "'cash CDO." Alternatively, a CDO may be created from income streams that result from a pool
of credit default swaps, a type of derivative. When a CDO is created from credit default swaps instead of cash
assets, it is called a ""synthetic CDO." Neal Deckant, Criticisms of Collateralized Debt Obligations in the Wake of
the Goldman Sachs Scandal, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 407,410 (2010).
2
SEC Litigation Release No. 21489, The SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud In Connection With The
Structuring
And
Marketing
of
A
Synthetic
CDO
(Apr.
16,
2010),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2010/lr21489.htm (Apr. 16, 2010); See also Securities and Exchange
Sachs
&
Co.
and
Fabrice
Tourre
Complaint,
available
at
Commission
v.
Goldman
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/20 10/comp-pr20 10-59 .pdf.
3
The SEC defines "mortgage-backed securities" as debt obligations that represent claims to the cash flows from
of
mortgage
loans~
most
commonly
on
residential
property.
See
pools
http://www.sec.gov/answers/mortgagesecLlfities.htm; see also SEC Complaint, supra at 5 (RMBS are securities
backed by residential mortgages. Investors receive payments out of the interest and principal on the underlying
mortgages).
4
SEC Press Release, SEC Charges Goldman Sachs With Fraud in Structuring and .Arlarketing of CDO Tied to
Subprime Mortgages (Apr. 16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-59.htm.
5
The SEC defines a ~'short position" as one resulting from "short sales." The SEC defines a "'short sale" as the sale
of any security which the seller does not own or any sale which is consummated by the delivery of a security
borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller. See http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsale.htm.
6
SEC Press Release~ supra note 4.
("tranches")~

"'The product was new and complex but the deception and conflicts are old and simple,"
said Robert Khuzami, Director of the Division of Enforcement.

7

Khuzami also added, "Goldman

wrongly permitted a client that was betting against the mortgage market to heavily influence
which mortgage securities to include in an investment portfolio, while telling other investors that
the securities were selected by an independent, objective third party."

8

The SEC alleged that one of the world's largest hedge funds, Paulson & Co. ("Paulson"),
paid Goldman Sachs to structure a transaction in which Paulson could take short positions
against mortgage securities chosen by Paulson based on a belief that the securities would
.
expenence
ere d"1t events 9 . 10

According to the SEC's complaint, the marketing materials for the CDO, known as
ABACUS 2007-AC 1 ("ABACUS"), all represented that the RMBS portfolio underlying the
CDO was selected by ACA Management LLC ('"ACA"), a third party with expertise in analyzing
credit risk in RMBS. 11

The SEC alleged that undisclosed in the marketing materials and

unbeknownst to investors, the Paulson hedge fund, which was poised to benefit if the RMBS
defaulted, played a significant role in selecting which RMBS should tnake up the portfolio. 12
The complaint alleged that after participating in the portfolio selection, Paulson
effectively shorted the RMBS portfolio it helped select by entering into credit default swaps 13

7

8
9

Jd.
!d.

A '"credit event" is defined as any sudden and tangible (negative) change in a borrower's credit standing or decline
in credit rating. A credit event brings into question the borrower's ability to repay its debt. It is the defining trigger
in a credit derivative contract, or credit default swap. If the borrower experiences a credit event, then the buyer of
the
contract
must
pay
the
seller
an
agreed-upon
sum
to
cover
the
loss.
See
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/credit-event.asp#axzzl ewctQVOO.
10
SEC Press Release, supra note 4.
II

12
13

Jd.
Jd.

A "credit default swap" is an over-the-counter derivative contract under which a protection buyer makes periodic
premium payments and the protection seller makes a contingent payment if a reference obligation experiences a
credit event. SEC Complaint, supra note 2, at 5.

2

("CDS") with GS&Co to buy protection on specific layers of the ABACUS capital structure.

14

Given that financial short interest, Paulson had an economic incentive to select RMBS that it
expected to experience credit events in the near future. 15 GS&Co did not disclose Paulson's
short position or its role in the collateral selection process in the term sheet, flip book, offering
memorandum, or other marketing materials provided to investors. 16
The complaint further alleged that Tourre, a GS&Co Vice President, was principally
responsible for ABACUS. 17 Tourre structured the transaction, prepared the marketing materials,
and communicated directly with investors. 18 Tourre allegedly knew of Paulson's undisclosed
short interest and role in the collateral selection process. 19 Additionally, he misled ACA into
believing that Paulson invested approximately $200 miiiion in the equity of ABACUS,
indicating that Paulson's interests in the col!atera! selection process were closely aligned with
ACA's interests.Z 0 However, in reality, their interests were sharply conflicting. 21
The deal closed on April 26, 2007, and Paulson paid GS&Co approximately $15 million
for structuring and marketing ABACUS?2 By October 2007, 83 percent of the RMBS in the
ABACUS portfolio had been downgraded and 17 percent were on negative watch? 3 By January
-"f\1\0

..::.vvo,

fil\

________ .._

77 _IJci~.;,au

_ _('.._)_ _____ .._£"_1~.

1

. .1 1

u1 tuc puruuuu m:t.u

-

1

1

1

o~;;~;;n uuwngrau~u

14

SEC Press Release, supra note 4.
!d.
16 !d.
17 Jd.
18 Jd
19 !d.
20
SEC Press Release, supra note 4.
21 Jd.
22 Jd
23 Jd.
24 Jd.
15
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a result, investors in the liabilities of ABACUS lost over $1 billion? 5 Paulson's opposite CDS
positions yielded a profit of approximately $1 billion for Paulson.

26

The SEC's complaint charged GS&Co and Tourre with violations of Section 17(a) of the
Securities Act of 1933 27 , Section 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193428 , and Exchange
Act Rule 10b-5 29 . 30 On July 15, 2010, the SEC announced that GS&Co would pay $550 million
and reform its business practices to settle the charges. 31

GS&Co agreed to settle the SEC's

charges without admitting or denying the allegations by consenting to the entry of a final
judgment that provides for a permanent injunction from violations of the antifraud provisions of
the Securities Act of 1933. 32 However, GS&Co did acknowledge that its marketing materials for
the ABACUS transaction contained incomplete information. 33
In response to the settlement, SEC Enforcement Director Khuzami commented, ''[h]alf a
billion dollars is the largest penalty ever assessed against a financial services firm in the history
of the SEC . . . [t]his settlement is a stark lesson to Wall Street firms that no product is too
complex, and no investor too

sophisticated~

to avoid a heavy price if a firm violates the

fundamental principles of honest treatment and fair dealing." 34

25
26

ld.

SEC Litigation Release No. 21489, supra, note 2.
15 U .S.C. §77q(a) ("the Securities Act").
28
15 U.S.C. §78j(b) C'the Exchange Act").
29
17 C.F .R. §240.1 Ob-5.
30
SEC Press Release, supra note 4.
31
SEC Press Release, Goldman Sachs to Pay Record $550 Million to Settle SEC Charges Related to Subprime
lvfortgage CDO (July 15, 201 0), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/201 0/201 0-123.htm (the settlement
requires remedial action by GS&Co in its review and approval of offerings of certain mortgage securities, including
the role and responsibilities of internal legal counsel, compliance personnel, and outside counsel in the review of
written marketing materials for such offerings. The settlement also requires additional education and training of
GS&Co employees in this area of the firm's business).
32
!d. (Tourre is litigating the charges against him.)
33
!d. (GS&Co acknowledged that, in particular, it was a mistake for the GS&Co marketing materials to state that
the reference portfolio was "selected by" ACA without disclosing that role of Paulson in the portfolio selection
process and that Paulson's economic interests were adverse to CDO investors.)
27

34

!d.

4

Subsequently, the SEC was directed by Section 621 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 201035 (''Dodd-Frank" or ''the Act") to promulgate
rules to ensure that securitization participants of asset-backed securities36 ("ABS") shall not, for
a year after the date of the closing of the ABS sale, engage in transactions that would involve or
result in any material conflict of interest with respect to investors. 37 Just over one year after the
GS&Co settlement, on September 19, 2011, the SEC unanimously agreed to propose a new rule,
Rule 127B, which closely mirrors the language of Section 621. 38
Rule 127B is a product of crisis legislation, as such, it was misconceived and is
improperly tailored; the proposal does not address the real failures underlying the fmancial
mechanism in question, and, as proposed, may create unnecessary restrictions on asset-backed
securitization markets and ¥viii be detrimental to the healthy functioning of the securitization
markets. Part II offers an overview of the proposed rule, its origination, and the prohibition and
exceptions it sets forth. Part II details the arguments posited by the proposed rule's supporters
and critics. Next, Part III analyzes why the arguments in favor of the rule fail and provides an

explanation of the real underlying problems regarding complex securitization transactions, which
•1
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the proposed rule, the potential harmful effects and undue cost of the proposed rule will be
minimized. Part V follows with a conclusion.

35

Public Law 111-203, §621, 124 Stat. 1376, 1632 (2010).
The SEC defines "asset-backed security" as a security that pays its investors from cash flows from a discrete pool
of financial assets such as mortgages. See 17 C.F.R. §229.110l(c)(l) (2008); Asset-Backed Securities, Exchange
Act Release Nos. 33-8518, 34-50905, 84 SEC Docket 1624 (Dec. 22, 2004).
37
Yin Wilczek, SEC Proposes Rule to Bar Transactions That Involve Conflicts for ABS Investors, BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS ("BNA"), 43 SRLR 1941 (Sept. 26, 2011).
38 Jd.
36

5

II.

PROPOSED

S.E.C. RULE 127B

A. The Dodd-Frank Mandate
Section 621 of Dodd-Frank adds new Section 27B to the Securities Act. Section 27B
prohibits an underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or
subsidiary of any such entity, of an ABS, including a synthetic ABS, from engaging in a
transaction that would involve or result in certain material conflicts of interest. 39 The prohibition
under Section 27B applies to both registered and unregistered offerings of ABS 40 •41

The

prohibition applies during the period ending on the date that is one year after the date of the first
closing of the sale of the ABS. 42 Exceptions from the prohibition are provided for certain riskmitigating hedging activities, liquidity commitments, and bona fide market-making. 43
Furthermore, Section 27B requires the SEC to issue rules for the purpose of imple1nenting the
new Section's prohibition. 44 To meet this statutory requirement, the SEC proposed Rule 127B
under the Securities Act. 45
"This rule is designed to ensure that those who create and sell asset-backed securities
cannot profit by betting against those same securities at the expense of those who buy them,"
SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said in her opening remarks at the September 19, 2011 SEC open
meeting. 46 "At the same time, the rule is not intended to interfere with traditional securitization
practices in which loans are originated, packaged into asset-backed securities, and offered to

39

SEC Release No. 34-65355, Prohibition Against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Sept. 19, 2011);
76 FR 60320 (Sept. 28, 2011 ), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/20 ll/34-65355fr.pdf.
40
ABS can be sold to investors in either a public offering, subject to an effective registration statement filed with the
SEC, or a private offering exempt from registration. /d. at 60321.
41
!d. at 60320.
42 /d.
43 /d.
44 ld.
45 /d.
46
Wilczek, supra note 37; Speech available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch091911mls.htm.

6

investors in different structures."47 If the proposed rule had been in place earlier, it would have
barred the alleged conduct by GS&Co and very similar conduct by other banks

48 49
•

B. The S.E .. C. Proposal
Proposed Rule 127B closely mirrors the language of Section 621.

50

Under the proposed

rule,
(a) An underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or
subsidiary of any such entity, of an asset-backed security (as such term is defined
in section 3 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, which for the purposes of
this rule shall include a synthetic asset-backed security), shall not, at any time for
a period ending on the date that is one year after the date of the first closing of the
sale of the asset-backed security, engage in any transaction that would involve or
result in any material conflict of interest with respect to any investor in a
transaction arising out of such activity.
(b) The following activities shall not be prohibited by paragraph (a): (1) Riskmitigating hedging activities,S 1 or (2) Liquidity commitment,5 or (3) Bona fide
market-making. 53

For the proposed rule to apply, five conditions must be present. The transaction must
involve: (1) covered persons, (2) covered products, (3) covered timeframe, (4) covered conflicts,
and (5) a "'material conflict of interest".

ld.
See SEC Litigation Release No. 22008, J.P. Morgan Securities to Pay $153.6 Million to Settle SEC Charges of
Misleading Investors in CDO Tied to U.S. Housing Market (June 21, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/1itreleases/2011/lr22008.htm; See also SEC Litigation Release No. 22134, Citigroup
To Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC Charges For 1\1/isleading Investors About CDO Company Profited From
Proprietary Short Position Former Citigroup Employee Sued For His Role In Transaction (Oct. 19, 2011), available
at http://www .sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/20 1 1/1r22134.htm.
49
Wilcze~ supra note 3 7.
50 ld.
51
Risk-mitigating hedging activities in connection with positions or holdings arising out of the underwriting,
placement, initial purchase, or sponsorship of an asset-backed security, provided that such activities are designed to
reduce the specific risks to the underwriter, placement agent~ initial purchaser, or sponsor associated with such
positions or holdings. See 76 FR 60320, supra note 39, at 60333.
52
Purchases or sales of asset-backed securities made pursuant to and consistent with commitments of the
underwriter, placement agent, initial purchaser, or sponsor, or any affiliate or subsidiary of such entity, to provide
liquidity for the asset-backed security. See id. at 60335.
53
Purchases or sales of asset-backed securities made pursuant to and consistent with bona fide market-making in the
asset-backed security. See id. at 60326.

47

48

7

It should be noted that, Rule 127B does not specifically set forth the types of conflicts it

covers. However, the SEC proposes that the scope of the conflicts of interest covered by the new
rule would be limited to: (1) conflicts of interest between an entity that is a securitization
participant with respect to an ABS and an investor in such ABS, (2) conflicts of interest between
a securitization participant and an investor that arise as a result of or in connection with the ABS
transaction, and (3) conflicts of interest that arise as a result of or in connection with
'"engage[ing] in any transaction." 54 Also, Rule 127B would apply only to ''material conflicts of
interest". But, the SEC does not define ''material conflict of interest". The release contains an
SEC explanation that it is unwilling to set forth an explicit definition because of the possibility
that any such attempt would be both under- and over-inclusive and result in unintended
consequences.

The SEC does note that certain conflict of interest are inherent in the

securitization process, and does not intend to alter or curtail the legitimate functioning of the
securitization markets. The SEC proposes to clarify the scope of conflicts of interest that are
material through interpretive guidance rather than through a detailed definition in the proposed
rule. 55

54

!d. at 60328.
Preliminarily, the SEC believes that engaging in a transaction will involve or result in a material conflict of
interest between a securitization participant and investors if:
1. Either (A) a securitization participant would benefit directly or indirectly from the actual, anticipated
or potential (I) adverse performance of the asset pool supporting or referenced by the relevant ABS,
(II) loss of principal, monetary default or early amortization event on the ABS, or (III) decline in the
market value of the relevant ABS; or (B) a securitization participant, who directly or indirectly controls
the structure of the relevant ABS or the selection of assets underlying the ABS, would benefit directly
or indirectly from fees or other forms of remuneration, or the promise of future business, fees, or other
forms of remuneration, as a result of allowing a third party, directly or indirectly to structure the
relevant ABS or select assets underlying the ABS in a way that facilitates or creates an opportunity for
that third party to benefit from a short transaction as described in clause (A) above; and
2. there is a "substantia] likelihood" that a "reasonable" investor would consider the conflict important to
his or her investment decision (including a decision to retain the security or not).
Jd at 60329.
55

8

Securities Act Section 27B does not contain a disclosure provision, and as-proposed,
neither does Rule 127B.56

However, the SEC is seeking comment concerning the role of

disclosure in the context of Securities Act Section 27B and the proposed rule. 57 Section 28 of the
Securities Act provides the SEC with authority to adopt conditional and unconditional exemptive
rules or regulations "'to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public
interest~ and is consistent with the protection of investors."58 The SEC is soliciting comment as

to whether, in some circumstances, material conflicts of interest that would be prohibited under
Section 27B and the proposed rule could be addressed sufficiently through a conditional
exemption. 59

Specifically, provided the SEC were able to make the findings required by

Securities Act Section 28, the SEC could require disciosure, as a condition to an exemption, to
allow securitization participants to engage in what othef'Nise ·would be prohibited behavior under
Section 27B and the proposed rule. 60

C. Support and Criticisms of the Proposal
"In the aftermath of the financial crisis, it became clear that firms were creating financial
products, selling those same products to their customers, and then turning around and making
bets against ihose same products ihey just

soid;~

said SEC Commissioner Luis Aguiiar in his

speech at the SEC's open meeting on September 19, 2011. 61 This practice equates to
selling someone a car with no brakes and then taking out a life insurance policy
on the purchaser. In the [ABS] context the sponsors and underwriters of the
[ABS] are the parties who select and understand the underlying assets, and who
are best positioned to design a security to succeed or fail . . . [the ABS sponsors
and issuers], like the mechanic servicing a car, would know if the vehicle has
been designed to fail. And so they must be prevented from securing handsome
56

ld. at 60343.
SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60343.
58
Jd.; See 15 U.S.C. 77z-3.
59 Id.
60 !d.
57

61

Speech by SEC Commissioner Luis Aguiiar, Statement at SEC Open Nfeeting: Prohibiting Firms from Designing
Transactions to Fail (Sept. 19, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch09191llaa.htm.

9

rewards for designing and selling malfunctioning vehicles that undermine the
[ABS] markets. 62
The proposed rule is an important step forward to prohibit this practice and to protect investors
from being persuaded to invest in products designed to fail. 63 Section IV of the Proposed Rule
raises the possibility of using information barriers and disclosures in lieu of a complete
prohibition. 64 Supporters of the rule would advise against this. Although some supporters may
generally be in favor of using information barriers and disclosure to mitigate conflicts of interest,
they would suggest that short transactions should be absolutely prohibited, absent an
exemption. 65

In the context of the Proposed Rule, supporters argue that, there must be a

presumption that a material conflict of interest situation, where a securitization participant
engages in a transaction through which it benefits when the related ABS fails or performs
adversely, cannot be justified. 66
While superficially these positions in support of Rule 127B are persuasive, further
analysis, of the transactions covered by the proposed rule and the prohibition set forth by the
rule, reveals the potentially harmful and unintended consequences that the rule, as-proposed,
may create for the securitization markets.
Discourse exploded in the wake of the SEC v. GS&Co suit. 67 Critics blatned CDOs for
inflating the housing bubble and helping to bring about the recession, 68 credit rating agencies for

62
63

/d. (citing Cong. Rec. S5899 (daily ed. July 15, 2010) (statement by Sen. Levin)).
!d.

64

Chris Barnard, Comment on Prohibition against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Sept. 30, 201 1),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-38-ll/s73811-2.pdf.
65 !d.
66 !d.
67
See Deckant, supra note 1.
68
See Joel Nocera, A Wall Street Invention Let the Crisis !vlutate, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2010), available at
http://www .nytimes.com/2 0 10/04/1 7/business/1 7nocera.html.

10

inflating CDO ratings/ 9 and originators and short sellers, like GS&Co and Paulson, for
marketing synthetic CDOs that were expected to faif 0 •71 Despite the large volume of discourse,
few commentators discussed CDOs with any degree of technical clarity. 72

Likewise, a

preliminary concern with Dodd-Frank, and the proposed rule mandated under it, is whether
Congress itself understood the instruments and transactions with any degree of technical clarity
or whether Congress was swayed by other factors before legislating.
Following the recent housing bubble's burst, the subprime mortgage crisis, and the Great
Recession, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act on July 21, 2010. 73
overhaul was promised with the signing of Dodd-Frank into law. 74

A massive financial
One of the initiatives

introduced by Dodd-Frank was, as discussed above, to temporarily bar ihose who package and
distribute AB S from engaging in transactions that materially conflict with the interests of
investors.

However, given that some believe the passing of Dodd-Frank was motivated by

populist outrage/5 the efficacy of the provisions mandated by the Act must be questioned.
The dangers associated with post-crisis legislation and ''bubble laws" have been well
documented. 76

The U.S. Congress is subject to national public opinion and populist

69

See Robert Oak, Credit Ratings Agencies Complicit in Global Financial Casino Gambling Hall Dupe,
ECONOMIST POPULIST (Apr. 23, 201 0).
70
See Mark Trumbull, Goldman Sachs vs. SEC: "Vampire Squid" or "Doing God's Work"?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR (Apr. 21, 2010).
71
Deckant, supra note 1, at 407-08.
72
Jd. at 408; See Aline van Duyn, More Turmoil Looms in CDO Market, FINANCIAL TIMES (June 21, 2010) (simply
referring to CDOs as "complex," offering few technical details about their structure or function).
73
For an overview of the crisis, see RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF '08 AND THE
DESCENT INTO DEPRESSION (2009).
74
Matthew G. Lamoreaux, Obama Signs Dodd-Frank Reform Bill, J. OR ACCOUNTANCY (July 21, 2010), available
at http://www.journalofaccountancy .com/W eb/20 103125 .htm.
75
See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal Corporate Governance Round 11, 95 MINN. L. REv.
1779 (2011).
76
See id.; see also Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities
Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REv. 393 (2006); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, i 14 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005); Larry E. Ribstein? Bubble Laws, 40 Hou. L. REV. 77 {2003);
Charles P. Kindleberger, i\1anias, Panics and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises (4th ed. 2000).

11

sentiments. 77 During a bubble period, regulators and private gatekeepers tend to let their guard
down and there is a boom in fraud as fraudsters see opportunities and investors become more
greedy and trusting. 78

After a bubble bursts, investigators typically tum up evidence of

speculative excess and even widespread fraud. 79

Then, investors burnt by losses from the

bursting of the bubble and outraged by evidence of misconduct create populist pressure for new
regulation. 80 ''It is in the post-bubble environment, when scandals and economic reversals occur
and when corporate transactions grab the attention of the American public and the U.S.
Congress, that Congress often acts." 81
Due to the upswing in populist anger and accompanying intense public pressure for
action following the bursting of bubbles, post-bubble periods offer "windows of opportunity to
well-positioned policy entrepreneurs to market their preferred, ready-made solutions when there
is little time for reflective deliberation." 82 Bubble laws tend to be adopted in a hurry and the
pressure to act quickly benefits policy entrepreneurs who have pre-packaged purported solutions
that can be readily adapted into legislative form. 83

Therefore, legislating in the immediate

aftermath of a public scandal or crisis, as vvere the circumstances surrounding Dodd-Frank, is a
formula for poor public policyrnaking; urgency prevents careful and balanced consideration of
the issues, and instead facilitates ''a window for action by the better-positioned, not the better
informed, policy entrepreneurs."84

77

Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1785.

ld.
79 Jd.
78

80

Id.; see also Alice Bartoo, Comment on Prohibition against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Oct.
11, 2011) (requesting the SEC "[p]Iease implement ... all the regulations of the Dodd-Frank [A]ct .... I would like
to see some strength of leadership at correcting as many of [these] terrible, greedy and risky actions as possible."),
available at http://www.sec.gov/comrnents/s7-38-llls73811-4.htm.
81
Jd. at 1786 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
82
!d. (quoting Romano, supra note 77, at 1590).
83
Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1786.
84
Romano, supra note 77, at 1602.

12

Experts have independently demonstrated that this pattern of boom-bust-regulation is a
reoccurring phenomenon in American law. 85 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("SOX") and
Dodd-Frank are just the latest iterations of this process. 86

Indeed, in describing the current

situation, one commentator wrote,
The Obama administration thinks it has discovered the perfect formula to cram
legislation through in a hurry: Demonize some prominent finn within an industry
you plan to redesign, and then pass a law that has nothing to do with the
accusation against the demonized firm. They did this with health insurance and
now they're trying it with fmance .... Today, the new demon de jour is Goldman
Sachs, a handy scapegoat to promote hasty financial rejiggering schemes .... The
SEC's dubious civil suit against Goldman is a wasteful diversion at best. It has
nothing to do with the Obama administration's suicidal impulse to impose more
tough regulations and taxes on banks to encourage them to lend more. 87
In this case, Section 621 under Dodd-Frank was pooriy conceived and there is a disconnect
between means and ends. A further analysis of ABS transactions suggests that the provision was
seriously misconceived because it is unlikely to cure the central problems of the securitization
markets or othervvise protect and benefit investors as Congress intended.

III.

WHY THE PROPOSED RULE DOES NOT SOLVE THE REAL PROBLEM

Though conflicts of interest between those who structured ABS and their investors played
a role in the CDO mdtdovv·:u, the conflicts ;;;,;ere m.u.ch less important iu the market failure than
the assets underlying the instruments and transactions involved. The center of the problem for
securitization markets was the widespread distribution of securities that were so complex that,
due to a lack of transparency, they could not be valued accurately, which opened the door to
fraud and abuse. The proscription in proposed Rule 127B fails to address these issues.
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See Ribstein, supra note 77, at 83-94; Romano, supra note 77, at 1590-94.
Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1786.
87
Alan Reynolds, SEC vs. Goldman Sachs: Legislation by Demonization (Apr. 21, 2010), available ai
http://www .cato-at-liberty .org/sec-vs-goldman-sachs-legislation-by-demonology/.
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A. Complexity and the Credit Rating Agencies
Although much attention has been given to the conflicts of interest, such as was involved
in the ABACUS case, which can arise in the structured products market, of greater concern is
that structured products are complex and as one commentator noted, "the more complex, the less
understandable." 88 Some products are composed of a complex set of risk ele1nents that are very
difficult for investors to compile on their own. 89 Others provide investors exposure to types of
risks or markets that they could not invest in directly. 90

The correct price of even siinple

structured products is difficult for many investors to determine on their own. 91

To price

structured products, investors need to have an understanding of the relationship among the
various elements of a structure in order to accurately gauge the valuation impact of having those
elements packaged together into a single product. 92 Aside from pricing difficulties, investors
often fail to fully appreciate the risk of loss they take when purchasing structured products. 93
While an investor may generally understand the nature of the risk embedded in the product, the
complexity of the structure may make it difficult to determine with any degree of precision how
market movements will itnpact the product's value. 94 Thus, the foundational concern regarding
structured products is the potential inability of investors to properly price, or fully assess the
embedded risks of, structured products. 95

88

See Suzanne H. Shatto, Comment on Prohibition against Conflicts of Interest in Certain Securitizations (Oct. 8,
2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-38-ll/s73811-3.htm.
89
Bennett, supra note 109, at 814-15.
90
ld. at 815.
91 ld.
92
!d. at 816.
93 !d.
94
!d. ("This difficulty is exacerbated by the fact that many products are structured to include a leverage factor that
multiples the impact of any movement in the value of the underlying asset or index. For example, each onepercentage point movement in the underlying index may produce a two or three percentage point change in the
product's value. Leveraged products thereby increase the opportunity for gains, but also the likelihood that the
investor will suffer significant losses.").
95
Bennett, supra note 109, at 816.
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The heart of the problem is that, due to the complexity of the products, unregulated
ratings for ABS became proxies for the full disclosure required by securities law. 96 When ABS
were repackaged into complex CDOs or used indirectly to create derivative obligations such as
CDSs, participants in transactions and institutions holding the securities relied on the high ratings
given to component ABS rather than looking at the assets underlying them. 97 The disclosures
concerning these instruments failed to warn of weaknesses in the assets on which they rested. 98
Over time, the CDO market's quality controls expanded beyond the scope of federal
securities regulation which permitted irresponsible and fraudulent practices concerning financial
instruments underlying ABS and their derivatives. 99 Ratings by private rating agencies largely
dispiaced the structured disclosure requirements of securities law as the primary basis for
investors' purchase of the securities. 100 That rating system, full of rampant conflicts of interest
as a product of the rating agencies getting paid by the issuers of the securities they rated, failed to
detect the increasing risk in the debt instruments used as the collateral for the CDO system. 101
Originally, credit rating agencies 102 ('~CRAs") rated corporations, or their ability to repay
particular debt securities, and earned revenues from investor subscriptions. 103 In the 1970s, the
CRAs changed their business model to base their revenues on fees from issu.ers of securities that

96

Richard E. Mendales, Collateralized Explosive Devices: Why Securities Regulation Failed to Prevent the CDO
Meltdown, and How to Fix It, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 1359, 1361 (2009).
97
!d. at 1362.
98 !d.
99
!d. at 1363.
100 !d.
101 !d.
102
The three most important agencies for purposes of the CDO market are Moody's, Standard & Poor's ("S&P"),
and Fitch. As of2002, ~1oody's and S&P together had almost 80% ofthe global market share for rating securities;
Fitch had 14%, and the remainder was scattered among smaller newcomers. See Challenging Times for Credit
IRISH
TIMES
(Dec.
13,
2002),
available
at
Ratings
lvfonopoly,
http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/finance/2002/1213/i039700348175.html.
103
ld.; see Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L. Q. 43,49-50 (2004).

15

they rated; 104 this created a conflict of interest because it gave the CRAs a powerful incentive to
.
. customers f:avora bl e ratings.
.
105
gtve
t h etr

In 1975, the SEC approved the use of ratings by

Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations ("NRSROs") to judge the quality of
securities that broker-dealers could use to satisfy their capital requirements.
SEC expanded the use of ratings to other areas as welL 107

106

Subsequently, the

Additionally, federal and state

regulators, in establishing standards for institutions such as banks and insurance companies,
began requiring that securities be top-rated to

be

counted toward minilnal capital

requirements. 108 As a result of ratings becoming more widely used, ABS that were rated in the
top rating categories were considered equivalent to securities issued or guaranteed by
government-sponsored enterprises, even though the ABS lacked an express or implied federal
guaranty. 109
The creation of CDOs increased the complexity of certain ABS. 110 The layers between
debt instruments providing the underlying cash flow for the instruments and the final instruments
sold on the markets destroyed the transparency that the securities laws were designed to create,
and made the unregulated rating system a substitute for due diligence in determining quality. 111
To rate ABS, CRAs began with a '"loan tape" which described the characteristics of the included
obligations. 112 CRAs were not, however, required to use due diligence to assure the validity of

104

See Hill, supra note 137, at 50 ("The change in business model coincided with another change that made the
agencies more important actors in the issuance of [ABSs]: government bodies, ironically led by the SEC, began to
use the agencies' ratings to measure the quality of the securities held by regulated entities.").
105
Mendales, supra note 132, at 1373.
106
ld. at 1374.
107
ld. (Such as regulations under the 1940 Act, under which taxable money market funds may not hold more than
five percent of their assets in securities rated below the top tier ratings of at least two rating agencies.)
108
ld. at 1375.
109
110

ld.

Ill

Jd.
Jd.
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Mendales, supra note 132, at 1381.
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the infonnation on the loan tape. 113 Then, in order to rate each particular tranche of a particular
issue, CRAs applied their statistical models to the characteristics of each pool of obligations.

114

Unlike ratings for typical corporate debt securities, investors could not easily double-check the
balance sheet, income statement, and SEC filings designed to maximize transparency of an
offering. 115 To the contrary, the rating for a tranche of any CDO has been equated to a kind of
Hblack box," which is not easily subject to analysis by purchasers. 116

Even sophisticated

investment professionals have found that CDOs consisting of multiple types of obligations are
impossible to value and have nothing to rely upon but the rating system. 117
As ABS and their derivatives became more complex, transparency declined, and the
market became even more dependent on the rating systern, with little concern for its accuracy. 118
For example, ''[f]or a synthetic CDO based on derivative obligations resting on a pool of AAArated [ABS], a purchaser was not in a good position to backtrack to determine whether the AAA
ratings reflected consistent up-to-date statistical models applied correctly to underlying pools of
well-documented obligations with known characteristics." 119

However, the CRAs did not

perform due diligence to ensure adequate documentation for each mortgage in a pool, nor did
they determine whether mortgages represented higher risks than ;vould be permitted u.ndcr

Jd.
1141d.
115 Jd.
116
Mendales, supra note 132, at 1381.
117
Louise Story, A Question of Value: What's an Asset Worth? It's Not Always Easy to Tell, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2008, at Cl (reporting that investment professionals were unable to value CDOs).
118
Jd. at 1376.
119
Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES MAG., at 41 (Apr. 27, 2008) (A single offering may include
tranches rated AAA (S&P's top investment-grade rating), tranches with lower but still investment-grade ratings, and
tranches rated below investment grade. Because top-rated tranches enjoy the right to collections from all obligations
in a pool before lower-rated tranches may receive anything, they may receive ratings indicating stronger payment
ability than most - or even all - of the individual sources of cash flow in a pool. A mortgage-backed security may
thus receive a top rating even though all the mortgages backing it are subprime ).
II3

17

Ginnie Mae standards, 120 or whether the 1nortgages had qualitatively different characteristics
making default almost certain. 121

Furthermore, due to a duopoly in rating ABS and their

derivatives, Moody's and S&P were under no competitive pressure to update their statistical
. con d.1t1ons.
.
122
mo de1s to re fl ect chang1ng
By not performing due diligence on the pools they were rating, the CRAs failed to
recognize significant qualitative changes in the loans underlying the securities they rated; they
also failed to change their statistical models based on the increasing complexity of ABS and
changes in the housing market. 123 In the recent housing bubble, what were called "'subprime"
loans did not fit the historic model of documented loans to mortgagors with a suspect credit
history. 124 The subprime loans included loans to mortgagors with no equity and loans that were
completely undocumented. 125

Therefore, the loans were prone to fraud by mortgagors who

overstated their incomes and by bloated appraisals of mortgaged property, or they were time
bombs due to reset at rates above the mortgagor's ability to pay. 126 These were not simply loans
with a higher probability of default, they were loans with a near certainty of default. 127 In fact,
the inadequacy of the rating system models vvas clear based on information available before the
housing 1narket crash. 128 Top ratings, which are supposed to indicate a strong capacity to pay
principal and interest, were inconsistent across different types of debt securities. 129

Under

Moody's system, 2.2% of corporate bonds rated Baa (the lowest investment-grade rating)
120

Ginnie Mae rules preclude it from guaranteeing pools of loans including characteristics such as significantly
higher interest rates than those currently being paid on Ginnie Mae securities, or with refinancing built into the
structure ofthe loans. Mendales, supra note 132, at note 129.
121
Id. at 1377.
122 !d.
123
!d. at 1379-80.
124
ld. at 1396.
125 ld.
126
Mendales, supra note 132, at 1396.
127 !d.
128 Jd.
J:?Q ld.
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defaulted for each five-year period from 1983-2005. 13

For CDOs with the same rating, the

average five-year default rate from 1993 to 2005 was 24%. 131 For municipal bonds with the
same rating, the five-year default rate was only 0.097%.

132

Prior to the meltdown, the CRAs were not required to disclose underlying information to
which they applied their statistical models to rate a given ABS or CDO. 133 However, since the
meltdown, the SEC has proposed new rules and amendments intended to increase transparency
and improve the integrity of credit ratings. 134 The proposed rules would implement certain
provisions of Dodd-Frank and enhance the SEC's existing rules governing credit ratings and
NRSROs. 135

Under the SEC's proposal, NRSROs would be required to: report on internal

controls; protect against conflicts of interests; establish professional standards for credit analysts;
publicly provide - along with the publication of the credit rating - disclosure about the credit
rating and the methodology used to determine it; and enhance their public disclosures about the
performance of their credit ratings. 136 The SEC's proposal also requires disclosure concerning
third-party due diligence reports for ABS. 137
It remains to be seen whether these measures will fully correct these foundational

130

Richard Tomlinson & David Evans, The Ratings Charade, BLOOMBERG (July 2007), available at
http://www .bloomberg.com/news/marketsmag/ratings.html.
131 ld
132 !d.
133
Mendales, supra note 132, at 1382 (Interestingly, in 2007, well at-9:er the subprime default crisis had begun,
Moody's announced that it was changing the model that it had adopted in 2002 to rate securities on subprime
mortgages. Therefore, when the rating system failed, beginning with subprime mortgage defaults in 2006, not only
private investors but even financial institutions around the world found it impossible to value the CDOs they held).
134
SEC Press Release, SEC Proposes Rules to Increase Transparency and Improve Integrity of Credit Ratings (May
18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/20 11/20 ll-113.htm.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
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B. Dangers Associated with the Proposal's Proscription
There is a danger that, concerning Dodd-Frank's Section 621, and now SEC Rule 127B,
legislators adopted proposa]s of policy entrepreneurs without a careful consideration of the costs
and consequences associated with the policy prescriptions.

Unfortunately, because policy

entrepreneurs tend to be critics of markets and corporations, bubble laws often do, and in this
case may, "impose regulation that penalizes or outlaw·s potentially useful devices and practices
and more generally discourages risk-taking by punishing negative results and reducing the
rewards for success." 138

The proposed prohibition of certain securitization transactions and

structures could unduly stifle the free flow of capital, constrain market participants in managing
their risks, frustrate capital formation, and cut investors off from investment opportunities. 139
Some commentators are worried that proposed Rule 127B's prohibition 1nay prove to be overinclusive, banning more than is called for- the proposal may characterize a ••material conflict of
interest" too expansively and the proposal may implement the statutory exceptions for hedging
activities, liquidity commitments, and market making too narrowly. 140 These concerns should be
heeded. If not properly tailored, proposed Rule 127B and the prohibition it sets forth may prove
to unduly restrain a beneficial financial mechanism.
If the government proscribed or banned transactions for which information asymmetry
exceeded a certain level, one of the most immediate potential consequences would be the
elimination of many, if not most, structured transactions. 141 Stn1ctured transactions are widely

138

Bainbridge, supra note 76, at 1787 (quoting Ribstein, supra note 77, at 83).
See Speech by SEC Commissioner Troy Paredes, Statement at Open j'vfeeting to Propose Rule Amendments to
of Interest
in
Certain
Securitizations
(Sept.
19,
2011),
available
at
Prohibit
Conflicts
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/20 11/spch091911 tap.htm.
140 !d.
141
Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. I, 21
(2004).
139

20

used and accepted. 142 Often structured transactions are efficient means of obtaining funding for
their participants while also achieving various accounting, tax and regulatory benefits.

143

They

reflect the innovation for which the US capital markets are known, have many legitimate uses,
and comprise a significant part of the US capital markets. 144 These types of transactions are
efficient because they serve to transfer investment risks to those who have the most expertise, or
the most willingness to invest, in the risks. 145 Indeed, securitization transactions are normally
viewed as socially desirable. 146 Even despite the subprime mortgage crisis, there is evidence that
securitization has still created overall value in the financial markets. 147
Another reason that the government should not proscribe transactions as a means of
controlling inforrnation asymrnetry is that any such bans may create "regulatory arbitrage
incentives" in which parties would aspire to structure transactions in ways that appear to meet
regulatory requirements. 148

The consequences of such actions would be undesirable: the

regulatory proscription would be bypassed and the transaction costs would rise due to added
expenses of lawyers and other advisors hired to help structure the transaction. 149 For these
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In re Enron Corp., No. 01-16034 (AJG) (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 21, 2002) (First Interim Report ofNeal Batson,
Court-Appointed Examiner), at 22 (noting, for example, that "total outstanding mortgage-backed and asset-backed
United
States
alone
exceed
$6
trillion"),
available
at
securities
in
the
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/InterimReportlofExaminer.pdf.
143 /d.
144 !d.
145
Schwarcz, supra note 142, at 21 ("There is usually a panoply of risks associated with any given originator. In a
securitization, for example, the originator separates particular financial assets from those risks by selling or
otherwise transferring those assets to a '"bankruptcy-remote" SPE. Investors in the SPE can, therefore, base their
investment decisions solely on the risks associated with the transferred assets. Moreover, even those limited risks
can be borne by providers of credit enhancement or investors in subordinated securities, parties who are in the
business of precisely assessing and absorbing such risks. As a result, the universe of investors interested in
investing in those assets greatly expands").
146
Steven L. Schwarcz, Disclosure's Failure in the Subprime 1\1/ortgage Crisis, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 1109, 1118
(2008).
147
!d.; see Xudong An, Yongheng Deng & Stuart A. Gabriel, Value Creation Through Securitization: Evidence
from the CMBS Market (Feb. 18, 2008) (SSRN working paper no. 1095645).
148
Schwarcz, supra note 142, at 22.
149 !d.
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reasons, the proscription of structured transactions may be unwise and may yield undesired
results.
Some commentators question why banks were even allowed to create and sell products
like the synthetic CDO at the center of the GS&Co ABACUS case. 150 And, in the same vein,
they wonder what purpose a synthetic CDO, which contains no actual mortgage bonds, serves for
the capital markets, and for society. 151 Additionally, critics argue that since buyers and sellers of
CDSs often have no stake in the underlying instrument, such swaps function like an insurance
policy. 152 One party collects a fee for promising to, essentially, insure a bond; the other party
makes the premium payments, and gets a big payoff if the bond goes bad. 153 The proble1n, some
say, is that swaps are open to anyone, including parties vvith nothing to insure. 154 Therefore,
allowing speculators to bet on entities in which they have no stake is similar to "letting your
neighbor take out an insurance policy on your life."i 55

In the end, critics argue, the CDOs

involved in the GS&Co trades, "were simply a side bet - like those in a casino - that allowed
speculators to increase society's mortgage wager without financing a single house." 156 However,
contrary to these views, structured products remain an important investment tool for both retail
and institutional investors. 157
A more detailed description of securitization is essential to better understand the benefits
that the above mentioned instruments provide to financial markets.

The SEC describes

securitization as: a financing technique in which financial assets, in many cases illiquid, are
pooled and converted into instruments that are offered and sold in the capital markets as
150
151

See Andrew Ross Sorkin, When Deals on Wall Street Resemble a Casino Wager, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010).
!d.

152

See Roger Lowenstein, Gambling With the Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2010).
!d.
154 ld.
155 ld.
156 !d.
153

157

See Sorkin, supra note 91.
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securities. 158 This fmancing technique makes it easier for lenders to exchange payment streams
coming from loans, or other pooled assets, for cash allowing them to make additional loans or
credit available to a wide range of borrowers and companies seeking financing. 159 As a result of
securitization, the credit and other risks associated with the pooled assets are transferred away
from the sponsor's balance sheet to investors in the ABS. 160
Over the years, the securitization process significantly evolved. 161

There are now

synthetic ABS in which investors in securities issued by special purpose entities 162 ('"SPE")
acquire credit exposure to a portfolio of fixed income assets without the SPE owning these
assets. 163

The investors gain this exposure because the SPE has entered into derivatives

transactions, such as CDSs that reference particular assets. 164 The counterparly" to the CDS n1ay

be the sponsor who originated or selected the underlying portfolio. 165 The SPE, as seller of
protection under the CDS, is in effect long the credit exposure on those assets as if it had
purchased them. 166

158

Asset-Backed Securities, SEC Release No. 33-9117 (Apr. 7, 2010), 75 FR 23328,23329 (May 3, 2010) (Some of
the types of assets that are financed today through securitization include residential and commercial mortgages,
agricultural equipment leases, automobile loans and leases, student loans and credit card receivables).
159

~

1

Ja_

160

See SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60321 (one type of ABS is a CDO).

161

Jd.

162

See id. (a financial institution or other entity, commonly known as a sponsor, first originates or acquires a pool of
financial assets. The sponsor then sells the financial assets, directly or through an affiliate, to a special purpose
entity. The SPE issues the securities supported or "backed" by the financial assets. These securities are then sold to
investors).
163 !d.
164 !d.
165 !d.
166
SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60321 (To illustrate, a bank that maintains fixed income assets on its balance
sheet may protect itself against default of those assets by purchasing a CDS from the SPE that references the same
or similar types of assets. In other cases, a person may desire to purchase CDS protection even though such person
does not own the reference assets underlying the CDS sold by the SPE. In both of these cases, the SPE, as seller of
the CDS protection, takes on the risk of default on the reference assets underlying the CDS (and the consequent
obligation to make a payment to the CDS counterparty as a result of such default) in exchange for ongoing payments
from the purchaser of the CDS protection. Additionally, in both scenarios any payments the SPE is required to
make under the CDS will be funded from amounts received by the SPE from the investors in the ABS issued by the
SPE. Hence, the proceeds ofthe SPE's issuance of securities typically are not used to purchase loa.t!s, receivables or
other investment assets, but instead are typically used to purchase highly creditworthy co11atera1 to support ( 1) the
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In both the non-synthetic ABS and the synthetic ABS, the SPE and the investors in the
SPE have an ongoing long exposure to each instrument in a reference pool of assets - assets held
directly by the SPE, in the case of a non-synthetic transaction, or assets referenced in a CDS
under ·which the SPE has sold protection to a counterparty, in the case of a synthetic
transaction. 167 However, the transactions differ in that the synthetic transaction inherently
involves a party- the counterparty to the CDS -that has purchased CDS protection on the same
reference pool of assets and thus has an ongoing short exposure to those assets. 168

This

purchaser of CDS protection may be a securitization participant - such as the bank sponsoring
the synthetic ABS. 169

In these transactions, and considering the CDS in isolation, the

securitization participant would be taking an investment position that is directionally opposite to
that taken by the investors in the synthetic ABS, as is generally the case in any transaction
through which a buyer is able to acquire and a seller is able to dispose of a particular financial
exposure in pursuit of their respective investment objectives. 170 If the referenced assets default,
the securitization participant receives a payment from the SPE pursuant to the CDS and the
investors in the SPE ultimately suffer a loss on their investment. 171 If the referenced assets do
not default, the investors would have benefited from payments from the CDS counterparty while
the SPE would not have any payment obligations to the CDS counterparty. 172
With respect to a particular structured product, the fact that a dealer responsible for the
structuring of the product and an investor were on opposite sides of the embedded derivative
SPE's contingent obligation to pay the purchaser of the CDS in the event of one or more defaults with respect to the
reference assets underlying the CDS (the synthetic reference pool of assets), and (2) to the extent not used for
payments to the CDS purchaser, the SPE's obligations to investors in the SPE's issued securities. The SPE makes
payments to investors based on cash flows and proceeds from the CDS and the collateral pool).
167
!d. at 60322.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 ld.
171 ld.
172
SEC Release, supra note 39, at 60322.
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was, for most of the history of the structured products market, seen as a natural economic fact,
not a conflict of interest. 173 Structured product professionals believe that it is natural for a bank
to create a CDO by shorting the underlying reference portfolio, and standard that it would offset
part of that short position with a client. 174 A CDO cannot exist "vithout parties 'Willing to short
the reference portfolio because, as mentioned above, their payments fund the payments made to
the investors. 175 Investors can only take a long position in a synthetic CDO if someone else is
willing to go short. 176 It is a common and almost essential element of creating a structured
product for a dealer to take the opposite position from the investors in a structured product. 177
However, the fact that the dealer may profit to the same extent as the investors' loss if the
investors iose on a transaction creates the appearance of a conflict. 178 No matter how distasteful
this may seem, in and of itself, this outcome is not impermissible and is simply a fundamental
reality regarding structured products.
Synthetic CDOs facilitate the management of risk and the flow of capital. 179 Meanwhile,
banks that have lent money to questionable borrowers use CDSs as a hedge - if the loans go bad,
the bank makes up for the loss by collecting on the CDS. 180 As mentioned above, a major source
uf vriii'-iiMu i:; that fiuaudal ii1stitutious took risky "bets" in synthetic CDOs. That is, instead of

using derivatives to hedge, institutions took positions in synthetic CDOs with the intention of

Michael Benne~ Complexity and Its Discontents: Recurring Legal Concerns with Structured Products, 7 N.Y.U.
J. L. & Bus. 811, 829 (2011).
174
Id. at 830.
175 !d.
173
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!d. ("This is a non-scandal. ... Synthetic CDOs cannot exist unless somebody is betting that they will lose value.
In such a zero-sum contes~ big investors who went long knew perfectly well that other investors had to be taking the
other side of the bet")
177
!d. at 831.
178 !d.
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earning Jong-terrn growth. 181 While s01ne firms made money, many others lost vast sums when
their derivative bets went wrong. 182

However, derivatives are not intended to be a growth-

enhancing investment. 183
Unlike investments in assets, derivatives are contracts that involve "parties" and
''counterparties," and one party's gain is another party's loss. 184 Theoretically, with a large
enough pool of CDSs, the amount the short position pays to the long position exactly equals the
sum total of credit defaults that the long position pays to the short position. 185 The objective in
designing a CDS is to ensure that at the outset the net present value of all exchanges of the
payments to be made by both sides will equal zero. 186 When used properly, derivatives allow
companies to hedge cash flow risk, allowing it to continue its investments. 187 If derivatives are
used to hedge risk, they can help bring regularity and certainty to a company's cash flow, which
may be used for investment and growth. 188 The core problem with the GS&Co ABACUS CDO,
and other structured finance transactions, was that "investors relied on flawed assessments of
risk." 189

181

Nocera, supra note 69.
Deckant, supra note 1, at 426; see also Sebastian Mallaby, In SEC vs. Goldman, who's really at fault?,
Washington Post (Apr. 21, 2010) ("[t]his is a non-scandal. The securities in question, so-called synthetic CDOs,
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IV.

THE CASE FOR INCLUDING A "ROLE FOR DISCLOSURE"

Proposed Rule 127B does not include a role for disclosure. A major concern is that when
a transaction or structure is banned under the proposed rule, investors may be forced to pass on
investment opportunities that they might otherwise welcome if given the opportunity to make an
informed choice. 190

One way to prevent sacrificing investor choice in the context of the

proposed rule could be to allow for disclosure to remedy what the rule would otherwise treat as a
prohibited material conflict of interest. 191 Such a response would fit into the traditional scheme
of federal securities law which favors disclosure, allowing investors to make their own
investment decisions as they wish with the benefit of the information provided for them. 192 The
federal securities laws depend on disclosure, not institutional constraints, following Justice
Brandeis's observation that "sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants," rather than judging
the merit of registered securities. 193 If, given a choice, an investor were to decide to transact in
the face of a properly identified and adequately disclosed conflict of interest, Rule 127B should
not block the investor from the investor's preferred investment. 194 Government decision making,
as effectuated through a ban on certain transactions and structures should not displace informed

ABS, other than those expressly exempted from registration under the securities laws, are
subject to the full disclosure requirements for securities issued for sale to the general public. 196
Although it is possible to privately place such securities and side-step the full disclosure required
by the securities la\-vs, a key purpose of securitization is, as elaborated above, turning illiquid

190

Paredes, supra note 140.
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assets into readily tradable instruments, and privately placed securities are not freely tradable. 197
Therefore, securitization participants generally provide disclosures to investors in ABS, which
should include adequate disclosure as to material conflicts of interest between investors and the
securitization participant. 198 However, as argued above, these conflicts of interests, although
having an appearance of impropriety, are not the causes of the foundational issues regarding
securitization, ABS, and CDOs.
Section 28 of the Securities Act provides the SEC with the authority to adopt conditional
or unconditional exe1nptive rules and regulations "to the extent that such exemption is necessary
or appropriate in the public interest, and is consistent with the protection of investors." 199
Discussed at length above, ABS and their derivatives are useful; they provide liquidity for
housing-based lending and for other types of securitized debt, and can be used effectively as
hedging strategies. 200 Thus, an effective response must preserve the advantages of the system
while addressing the underlying flaws that led to the crisis. 201 Being that the new rules and
regulations, proposed under Dodd-Frank, concerning the CRAs seek to redress the informational
inadequacies surrounding ABS, it appears that in most circumstances, material conflicts of
interest that would be prohibited under proposed Rule 127B can be adequately addressed through
a conditional exemption. 202 Therefore, the SEC should require disclosure, as a condition to an
exemption, to allow securitization participants to engage in what otherwise would be prohibited
behavior under the proposed rule. 203
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Another approach would be to tolerate insufficient disclosure.

Under this approach,

disclosure would remain the sole remedy for any informational asymmetry between an originator
and investors. 204 Supporters of this approach believe that in an efficient market, stock prices
virtually instantaneously reflect all publicly available information relevant to the value of the
traded securities; thus, not all investors need to understand any given disclosure.

205

However,

With complexity, few, if any,

complexity undermines the assumptions of this approach.

investors will actually understand even detailed disclosures regarding complex instruments in
order to act instantaneously and achieve an efficient market. 206
Perhaps supplemental protections, in addition to, not in place of, disclosure can be used
~
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sale of mortgages or other nonsecuritized debt obligations has historically been subject to state
law ?08 Being that these sales are now largely made for the purpose of securitization, fraud in
such transactions should be subject to uniform federal regulation. 209 If this were so, any material
misrepresentation regarding a CDO or the collateral underlying it would give rise to civil actions,
by the SEC and also by private investors who purchase a CDO in reliance on the

Furthermore, any sale of a debt instrument with knowledge that it would be securitized,
accompanied by any material misrepresentation concerning the instrument sold, should be a
violation of the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws. 212 Such remedy would seem
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to fit the GS&Co ABACUS circumstances well, which, "for all the trumpeting in the press about
an impenetrable sophisticated transaction, in the end boils down to a claim of a garden variety
fraud: Goldman misstated the tn1e nature of Paulson's involvement, thereby misleading those
who bet the value of the securities would rise."

V.

213

Conclusion
Proposed SEC Rule 127B must be implemented carefully for fear of hampering the

securitization markets. As a product of crisis legislation, the proposal was misconceived and, as
proposed, is improperly tailored. The proposal does not address the real failures underlying the
financial mechanism in question, namely, complexity of modem ABS and synthetic CDOs and
the failure of the CRAs to perform adequate due diligence to ensure that their ratings were
accurate.

In light of new rules and regulations under Dodd-Frank aimed at redressing the

integrity and accuracy deficiencies regarding the credit rating syste1n, the prohibition under Rule
127B is sure to create unnecessary restrictions on asset-backed securitization markets and will be
detrimental to the healthy functioning of the securitization markets. Investors would be better
protected and served by the incorporation of a role for disclosure to the proposed rule which
would minimize the potential harmful effects and undue cost of the proposed rule's prohibition.
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